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add some 'wired' features...

Topics: Feature Requests
Mar 7, 2016 at 6:40 PM
I'd go after:
1) possibility to set up boot-time password prompt in way that imitates hard drive error or alike, to hide the encryption software presence;
2) possibility to have another 'under pressure password' that could not only mount a fake OS partition (or non-secret part container of 'double-bottom' container) but also quietly destroy (the master key?) for real OS partition/secret container.
Mar 7, 2016 at 6:56 PM
owl wrote:
I'd go after:
1) possibility to set up boot-time password prompt in way that imitates hard drive error or alike, to hide the encryption software presence;
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You can already hide or even write a short custom message for the bootloader.

https://veracrypt.codeplex.com/wikipage?title=FAQ

However, just hidding or creating a custom error message in the bootloader does not prevent someone from knowing that you are using system encryption.

https://veracrypt.codeplex.com/wikipage?title=Plausible%20Deniability
...note that, for system encryption, the first drive track contains the (unencrypted) VeraCrypt Boot Loader, which can be easily identified as such (for more information, see the chapter System Encryption). When using system encryption, plausible deniability can be achieved by creating a hidden operating system (see the section Hidden Operating System).
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owl wrote:
2) possibility to have another 'under pressure password' that could not only mount a fake OS partition (or non-secret part container of 'double-bottom' container) but also quietly destroy (the master key?) for real OS partition/secret container.
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A variant of this feature request has been discussed and rejected due to an advisory or government agency is not going to let you access the original encrypted volumes. Also the source code is public. Therefore they can easily disable any attempts to wipe the headers by using their modified code on a cloned HDD.

There is a feature request created for a panic button.

https://veracrypt.codeplex.com/workitem/26
Mar 8, 2016 at 11:27 AM
Edited Mar 8, 2016 at 11:28 AM
Enigma2Illusion wrote:
However, just hidding or creating a custom error message in the bootloader does not prevent someone from knowing that you are using system encryption.
Against serious forensic analysis - yes, a fake boot-time prompt is not a defense, I agree. A defense would be, and I'm adding this to my 'wired features list' - a possibility to encrypt whole HDD (including MBR) and place VeraCrypt loader onto a memory stick. Then no forensic will prove that you have encrypted information on HDD because, by definition, it's indistinguishable from random data. You can always claim that you have just wiped your disk, which may include filling all the space with random numbers. When you try to boot such a machine without the flash disk with VeraCrypt loader on it - all you see is (genuine!) error message that MBR is corrupt. It will protect from Evil Maid attacks by the way- there would be no loader to be replaced (with exception to BIOS, which is a separate story).

In fact this is how DiskCryptor can be configured. I suggest that it's a great feature and it belongs to VeraCrypt road map. For all platforms.

Enigma2Illusion wrote:
A variant of this feature request has been discussed and rejected due to an advisory or government agency is not going to let you access the original encrypted volumes. Also the source code is public. Therefore they can easily disable any attempts to wipe the headers by using their modified code on a cloned HDD.
Well, again, if you're facing a competent and motivated adversary - yes, they will prevent you from destroying your data. But there could be a plenty of scenarios when a VeraCrypt user can be facing someone way below NSA-level. Besides, I believe it's just not reasonable to discard a feature on basis that it would not provide full guarantee. Data destruction password can work in some circumstances and it can be useful, even if in some other circumstances a user may be prevented from using it. Can it be reconsidered though?

Enigma2Illusion wrote:
There is a feature request created for a panic button.

https://veracrypt.codeplex.com/workitem/26
Cool. I'd be happy if it's extended with possibility to connect a hardware, physical button(s) (and/or, ideally a 'dead man's switch') which can be operated to trigger panic actions.
Mar 8, 2016 at 5:32 PM
Edited Mar 8, 2016 at 5:33 PM
Sorry, I misunderstood your first feature request as hiding or creating custom bootloader message instead of moving the bootloader from the OS drive to another device.

owl wrote:
Well, again, if you're facing a competent and motivated adversary - yes, they will prevent you from destroying your data. But there could be a plenty of scenarios when a VeraCrypt user can be facing someone way below NSA-level. Besides, I believe it's just not reasonable to discard a feature on basis that it would not provide full guarantee. Data destruction password can work in some circumstances and it can be useful, even if in some other circumstances a user may be prevented from using it. Can it be reconsidered though?
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I am not the developer of VeraCrypt. I am a user just like you and merely relaying prior discussions. Ultimately, it is up to the developer if your request should be implemented.
Mar 8, 2016 at 5:51 PM
Sure. Thanks for sharing your views anyway!