This project has moved and is read-only. For the latest updates, please go here.

2 requests: 1 super easy (10s for you to do), 1 a lot more difficult.

Topics: Feature Requests
Feb 20, 2016 at 6:26 AM
Edited Feb 20, 2016 at 6:27 AM
Easy: When I press F5 to unmask my password in the bootloader, I can type in my password and see it. This makes it easy to correct mistakes I might make when my fat fingers press 2 keys at once. But after I press [Enter] the password should be masked out rather than stay on my screen.

Hard: One of the most popular attacks against TC (and now VC) and FDE in general is an online attack where a hardware device is plugged into a PCI/eSATA/Firewire port on the computer to directly access the system memory. The device then dumps the entire contents of RAM to some external storage. Then some dude finds the master key in the memory and that's the end of your protection. A method that might prevent this from happening is to extremely-frequently move the location of the key + key schedule in memory (by large distances) and only maintain a single pointer to it (or a single pointer to a small list of pointers). If the key itself was erased after the key schedule was created, and the key schedule was broken into pieces and separated in RAM by very large distances, moved frequently, then any attempt to dump RAM would fail. By the time the dumper or searcher got to upper RAM addresses all of the data would have changed. A complete dump would not contain all of the key schedule data. This would require you to modify the source of all 3 encryption algorithms and the filter driver itself to split up the key schedules. BUT you would also be the first piece of cryptography software to prevent this popular attack!

Thoughts?
Feb 20, 2016 at 4:19 PM
Edited Feb 20, 2016 at 5:01 PM
FYI, version 1.17 implements masking the bootloader password.
Bootloader: Protect password/PIM length by filling the fields to maximum length with '*' after ENTER
.
Are you using 1.17? Are the password and PIM values still visible as plaintext when using F5 after hitting the enter key?
Feb 21, 2016 at 12:44 AM
Edited Feb 21, 2016 at 12:53 AM
Enigma2Illusion wrote:
FYI, version 1.17 implements masking the bootloader password.
Bootloader: Protect password/PIM length by filling the fields to maximum length with '*' after ENTER
.
Are you using 1.17? Are the password and PIM values still visible as plaintext when using F5 after hitting the enter key?
Whoops! I thought I was using 1.17, still on 16. I'll update right now. I looks like BootMain.cpp was updated to fix this bug.