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Plausible deniability - (Kind of)?

Topics: Users Discussion
Nov 18, 2015 at 12:16 PM
Using VeraCrypt only on a second harddrive/partition (not system partition), it can't (when dismounted) be identitifed as a VeraCrypt partition, right?

Let's say someone taking my computer once (not multiple times over time to compare the partition).

They, then might see that my OS (Windows) has accessed a VeraCrypt partition, or that Windows/programs has recently opened files on D: (which does not seem to contain any files now).

Couldn't I say that I have recently secure wiped the partition and it does not contain anything anymore?

Isn't plausible deniability kind of different regarding what you talk about?
If the court (in the UK for example) ask you for you password then this might be sufficient.
If we talk about extortion it might not be?
Nov 18, 2015 at 5:24 PM
Edited Nov 18, 2015 at 5:25 PM
Couldn't I say that I have recently secure wiped the partition and it does not contain anything anymore?
.
Google search "computer forensics USB drive". There are many tools that can tell when the drive was last mounted, written, read and which user account accessed the volume.

Also there are other ways that your data can be discovered.

https://veracrypt.codeplex.com/wikipage?title=Data%20Leaks

Only using system encryption and not providing your password will resolve these issues. Hidden OS is another option, however it is possible to tie when your computer was on the internet not matching the decoy OS usage.